

SECRET

25X1

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

DDI 5403-82a  
6 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1  
Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation  
Intelligence

SUBJECT: Warning Meeting--Nuclear Proliferation [REDACTED] 25X1

The Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation met on 23 June 1982 to discuss warning matters. Attached is my report based on the discussion that took place.

25X1

Attachment:  
As Stated

25X1

SECRET

25X1

**Page Denied**

DDI 5403-82  
6 July 1982Warning Report: Nuclear Proliferation\*

Pakistan: New reporting suggests that President Zia evidently has determined that achieving a capability to produce a nuclear device is at the top of the Pakistani security agenda, even though he should be fully aware that it puts US military assistance at risk. Planned plutonium extraction (reprocessing) operations would involve the use of fuel irradiated in Pakistan's only power reactor--a violation of safeguards agreements. Availability of enough fissile nuclear material for a test has slipped and now will not occur until latter half of 1983 at the earliest.

India: During her upcoming visit to the US, Prime Minister Gandhi may wish to cultivate an image of India as a responsible adherent to international nuclear agreements in contrast with a belligerent Pakistan bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Should the visit result in a reinforcement of any perception that the US lacks the ability or desire to hang tough with President Zia in turning him away from weapons-related pursuits, Gandhi might be inclined to order a test at the site that has been prepared for this purpose. Such an event could be seen by Gandhi as a) a first dramatic step in coping with a potential threat to India posed by Pakistani nuclear weapons, and b) a means of disrupting the US-Pakistani security relationship. Confirmation by India of any PRC assistance to Pakistan in its nuclear weapons work could prompt more immediate and severe Indian reactions. The chances of Indian military action or a nuclear test would be substantially greater.

\*This memorandum is produced periodically by the Special Assistant to the DDI for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

SECRET

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Argentina: We cannot discount the possibility that President Bignone might be inclined to act swiftly to activate the option to develop nuclear explosives as one means of restoring national honor and prestige in the wake of Argentina's decisive military defeat in the Falklands war. If such a decision entailed a desire to acquire this capacity before 1984, it would be necessary for Argentina to violate the IAEA safeguards in order to acquire the fissile material. Economic and political realities, however, argue for the more restrained, albeit determined, course that will give Argentina a capability for nuclear weapons development outside the safeguards system by about 1987.

SECRET

25X1